>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Let me put it as simply as I can.
1) Trade deficit represents demand for dollars since the rest of the world needs to net export to us to get'em. All dollars get created by US Federal govt spending. Since most govt spending goes directly to US residents - foreigners must get US residents to part with dollars by selling us stuff in excess of what they buy from us to get some.
2) Dollars get created when Federal govt cash spending exceeds Federal govt taxation. As doggy pointed out, net deficit spending will be the lowest in four years as measured by net additions to Federal govt debt held by the public. So a falling deficit means supply of new dollars is shrinking.
todd - what happens when demand is increasing (rising trade deficit as % of GDP) AND supply is falling (falling budget deficit as % of GDP) for a given commodity (US Dollar)?
Rising demand and falling supply doesn't sound like a recipe for a falling dollar to me.
More likely, it sounds like deflationary pressures via a superstrong US dollar. You may get your wish for falling stock market indices, but unfortunately for you it will be accompanied by falling gold and silver
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I'm saying that in today's monetary framework - its Federal cash spending in excess of Federal cash receipts (ie taxation) that is the main driver of the supply of dollars.
Its neither a short-term nor long-term prediction -- rather I use the data to demonstrate the relationship. I actually never did what you did - ie examine Mar-May periods to see if the dollar rises due to "seasonal" budget surpluses -- although that was interesting. Thanks.
For a longer term view of a similar relationship - look at the 1998 - 2001 period. The Federal budget went into a sustained surplus and the dollar as measured by its price in gold, or vs. CRB index, forex rates (weighted avg) strengthened undeniably during this period.
What I'm trying to do is to show that there is more of a relationship of the dollar to the state of the Federal budget than there is to trade deficits or interest rates.
If this is true then persistent Federal budget deficits are the natural order of things because as the economy grows (and it tends to be growing almost all the time) it needs increases in fiat money. This fiat money gets created by cumulative deficit spending that over time roughly matches the growth in the economy.
A surplus or even a balanced budget would suffocate the private economy because the private sector would be giving back to the govt equal amounts of fiat money through payment of tax obligations as would be created by Federal spending. If this went on long enough - dollars would become scarcer relative to the economy's growing demand for them and that would bring on monetary deflation.
Prices for goods and services obviously reflect demand and supply characteristics for that particular good and service. Prices can fall because of oversupply or falling demand -- that is not monetary deflation. The key here is that the price for that good or service is quoted in dollars and dollars have their own supply/demand curve. If prices are generally falling/rising due to the change in the value of the dollar -- that is true monetary deflation/inflation.
If the private economy isn't getting enough new dollars due to deficit spending - eventually prices fall due to a rising dollar. This is what started to happen in 1998-2001.
What we've seen since is a regression back to the norm as the Federal budget has reverted back to deficit mode and the dollar reflated back to a normal range. BTW, surpluses are unsustainable for exactly this reason -- they lead to deflation, which suffocates the economy - leading to falling wages, asset prices and, ultimately tax revenues - which forces the system back into budget deficits. This is why I say that budget deficits are the normal order of things and why we run them practically every year.
Some people on this board have focused on the trend since 2001 and drawn a straight line through it expecting it to continue straight to a dollar default. They're flat out wrong - even with this reflation -- net Federal debt held by the public as a % of GDP is still 10% lower than it was ten years ago and lower than almost all of the other G-7 countries.
The fact that Buffett has taken a hedge on his huge dollar position has also been misinterpreted as a one-way bet against the dollar. This is also wrong, IMHO, as Buffett would be the first to admit he has no particular insight into macroeconomic decisions and is merely human in this regard.
Wednesday, March 23, 2005
Monday, March 21, 2005
Shorting Stocks!!
| Re: a strategy through puts by: mungerian | 01/29/05 09:14 am Msg: 121318 of 134810 |
Given that you expect a KKD bankruptcy in the next few months (I do as well), I'd think you'd be looking for more leverage and buy out of the money puts. I own Jan '06 10's and 5's and May '05 10's and 7.5's; all were out of the money when I bought them and had at potential payouts in excess of 5 to 1 in the event of KKD declaring bankruptcy and the stock going under $1. The puts with strike prices of 5 and 7.5 had potential payouts much higher than that but obviously have greater risk of expiring worthless. I prefer buying longer term puts to give the laws of financial gravity time to play out and because they allow me to add to my positions during sucker rallies. I find this strategy much less stressful than being short and if I'm right on the stock it will be far more profitable with less risk. | |
Saturday, March 05, 2005
Buffet On Trade Deficit
Foreign Currencies Berkshire owned about $21.4 billion of foreign exchange contracts at yearend, spread among 12 currencies. As I mentioned last year, holdings of this kind are a decided change for us. Before March 2002, neither Berkshire nor I had ever traded in currencies. But the evidence grows that our trade policies will put unremitting pressure on the dollar for many years to come – so since 2002 we’ve heeded that warning in setting our investment course. (As W.C. Fields once said when asked for a handout: "Sorry, son, all my money’s tied up in currency.") Be clear on one point: In no way does our thinking about currencies rest on doubts about America. We live in an extraordinarily rich country, the product of a system that values market economics, the rule of law and equality of opportunity. Our economy is far and away the strongest in the world and will continue to be. We are lucky to live here. But as I argued in a November 10, 2003 article in Fortune, (available at berkshirehathaway.com), our country’s trade practices are weighing down the dollar. The decline in its value has already been substantial, but is nevertheless likely to continue. Without policy changes, currency markets could even become disorderly and generate spillover effects, both political and financial. No one knows whether these problems will materialize. But such a scenario is a far-from-remote possibility that policymakers should be considering now. Their bent, however, is to lean toward not-so-benign neglect: A 318-page Congressional study of the consequences of unremitting trade deficits was published in November 2000 and has been gathering dust ever since. The study was ordered after the deficit hit a then-alarming $263 billion in 1999; by last year it had risen to $618 billion. Charlie and I, it should be emphasized, believe that true trade – that is, the exchange of goods and services with other countries – is enormously beneficial for both us and them. Last year we had $1.15 trillion of such honest-to-God trade and the more of this, the better. But, as noted, our country also purchased an additional $618 billion in goods and services from the rest of the world that was unreciprocated. That is a staggering figure and one that has important consequences. The balancing item to this one-way pseudo-trade — in economics there is always an offset — is a transfer of wealth from the U.S. to the rest of the world. The transfer may materialize in the form of IOUs our private or governmental institutions give to foreigners, or by way of their assuming ownership of our assets, such as stocks and real estate. In either case, Americans end up owning a reduced portion of our country while non-Americans own a greater part. This force-feeding of American wealth to the rest of the world is now proceeding at the rate of $1.8 billion daily, an increase of 20% since I wrote you last year. Consequently, other countries and their citizens now own a net of about $3 trillion of the U.S. A decade ago their net ownership was negligible. The mention of trillions numbs most brains. A further source of confusion is that the current account deficit (the sum of three items, the most important by far being the trade deficit) and our national budget deficit are often lumped as "twins." They are anything but. They have different causes and different consequences. 19
A budget deficit in no way reduces the portion of the national pie that goes to Americans. As long as other countries and their citizens have no net ownership of the U.S., 100% of our country’s output belongs to our citizens under any budget scenario, even one involving a huge deficit.
As a rich "family" awash in goods, Americans will argue through their legislators as to how government should redistribute the national output – that is who pays taxes and who receives governmental benefits. If "entitlement" promises from an earlier day have to be reexamined, "family members" will angrily debate among themselves as to who feels the pain. Maybe taxes will go up; maybe promises will be modified; maybe more internal debt will be issued. But when the fight is finished, all of the family’s huge pie remains available for its members, however it is divided. No slice must be sent abroad.
Large and persisting current account deficits produce an entirely different result. As time passes, and as claims against us grow, we own less and less of what we produce. In effect, the rest of the world enjoys an ever-growing royalty on American output. Here, we are like a family that consistently overspends its income. As time passes, the family finds that it is working more and more for the "finance company" and less for itself.
Should we continue to run current account deficits comparable to those now prevailing, the net ownership of the U.S. by other countries and their citizens a decade from now will amount to roughly $11 trillion. And, if foreign investors were to earn only 5% on that net holding, we would need to send a net of $.55 trillion of goods and services abroad every year merely to service the U.S. investments then held by foreigners. At that date, a decade out, our GDP would probably total about $18 trillion (assuming low inflation, which is far from a sure thing). Therefore, our U.S. "family" would then be delivering 3% of its annual output to the rest of the world simply as tribute for the overindulgences of the past. In this case, unlike that involving budget deficits, the sons would truly pay for the sins of their fathers.
This annual royalty paid the world – which would not disappear unless the U.S. massively underconsumed and began to run consistent and large trade surpluses – would undoubtedly produce significant political unrest in the U.S. Americans would still be living very well, indeed better than now because of the growth in our economy. But they would chafe at the idea of perpetually paying tribute to their creditors and owners abroad. A country that is now aspiring to an "Ownership Society" will not find happiness in – and I’ll use hyperbole here for emphasis – a "Sharecropper’s Society." But that’s precisely where our trade policies, supported by Republicans and Democrats alike, are taking us.
Many prominent U.S. financial figures, both in and out of government, have stated that our current-account deficits cannot persist. For instance, the minutes of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee of June 29-30, 2004 say: "The staff noted that outsized external deficits could not be sustained indefinitely." But, despite the constant handwringing by luminaries, they offer no substantive suggestions to tame the burgeoning imbalance.
In the article I wrote for Fortune 16 months ago, I warned that "a gently declining dollar would not provide the answer." And so far it hasn’t. Yet policymakers continue to hope for a "soft landing," meanwhile counseling other countries to stimulate (read "inflate") their economies and Americans to save more. In my view these admonitions miss the mark: There are deep-rooted structural problems that will cause America to continue to run a huge current-account deficit unless trade policies either change materially or the dollar declines by a degree that could prove unsettling to financial markets.
Proponents of the trade status quo are fond of quoting Adam Smith: "What is prudence in the conduct of every family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage."
I agree. Note, however, that Mr. Smith’s statement refers to trade of product for product, not of wealth for product as our country is doing to the tune of $.6 trillion annually. Moreover, I am sure that he would never have suggested that "prudence" consisted of his "family" selling off part of its farm every day
20in order to finance its overconsumption. Yet that is just what the "great kingdom" called the United States is doing. If the U.S. was running a $.6 trillion current-account surplus, commentators worldwide would violently condemn our policy, viewing it as an extreme form of "mercantilism" – a long-discredited economic strategy under which countries fostered exports, discouraged imports, and piled up treasure. I would condemn such a policy as well. But, in effect if not in intent, the rest of the world is practicing mercantilism in respect to the U.S., an act made possible by our vast store of assets and our pristine credit history. Indeed, the world would never let any other country use a credit card denominated in its own currency to the insatiable extent we are employing ours. Presently, most foreign investors are sanguine: they may view us as spending junkies, but they know we are rich junkies as well. Our spendthrift behavior won’t, however, be tolerated indefinitely. And though it’s impossible to forecast just when and how the trade problem will be resolved, it’s improbable that the resolution will foster an increase in the value of our currency relative to that of our trading partners. We hope the U.S. adopts policies that will quickly and substantially reduce the current-account deficit. True, a prompt solution would likely cause Berkshire to record losses on its foreign-exchange contracts. But Berkshire’s resources remain heavily concentrated in dollar-based assets, and both a strong dollar and a low-inflation environment are very much in our interest. If you wish to keep abreast of trade and currency matters, read The Financial Times. This London-based paper has long been the leading source for daily international financial news and now has an excellent American edition. Both its reporting and commentary on trade are first-class. * * * * * * * * * * * * And, again, our usual caveat: macro-economics is a tough game in which few people, Charlie and I included, have demonstrated skill. We may well turn out to be wrong in our currency judgments. (Indeed, the fact that so many pundits now predict weakness for the dollar makes us uneasy.) If so, our mistake will be very public. The irony is that if we chose the opposite course, leaving all of Berkshire’s assets in dollars even as they declined significantly in value, no one would notice our mistake. John Maynard Keynes said in his masterful The General Theory: "Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally." (Or, to put it in less elegant terms, lemmings as a class may be derided but never does an individual lemming get criticized.) From a reputational standpoint, Charlie and I run a clear risk with our foreign-exchange commitment. But we believe in managing Berkshire as if we owned 100% of it ourselves. And, were that the case, we would not be following a dollar-only policy.
A budget deficit in no way reduces the portion of the national pie that goes to Americans. As long as other countries and their citizens have no net ownership of the U.S., 100% of our country’s output belongs to our citizens under any budget scenario, even one involving a huge deficit.
As a rich "family" awash in goods, Americans will argue through their legislators as to how government should redistribute the national output – that is who pays taxes and who receives governmental benefits. If "entitlement" promises from an earlier day have to be reexamined, "family members" will angrily debate among themselves as to who feels the pain. Maybe taxes will go up; maybe promises will be modified; maybe more internal debt will be issued. But when the fight is finished, all of the family’s huge pie remains available for its members, however it is divided. No slice must be sent abroad.
Large and persisting current account deficits produce an entirely different result. As time passes, and as claims against us grow, we own less and less of what we produce. In effect, the rest of the world enjoys an ever-growing royalty on American output. Here, we are like a family that consistently overspends its income. As time passes, the family finds that it is working more and more for the "finance company" and less for itself.
Should we continue to run current account deficits comparable to those now prevailing, the net ownership of the U.S. by other countries and their citizens a decade from now will amount to roughly $11 trillion. And, if foreign investors were to earn only 5% on that net holding, we would need to send a net of $.55 trillion of goods and services abroad every year merely to service the U.S. investments then held by foreigners. At that date, a decade out, our GDP would probably total about $18 trillion (assuming low inflation, which is far from a sure thing). Therefore, our U.S. "family" would then be delivering 3% of its annual output to the rest of the world simply as tribute for the overindulgences of the past. In this case, unlike that involving budget deficits, the sons would truly pay for the sins of their fathers.
This annual royalty paid the world – which would not disappear unless the U.S. massively underconsumed and began to run consistent and large trade surpluses – would undoubtedly produce significant political unrest in the U.S. Americans would still be living very well, indeed better than now because of the growth in our economy. But they would chafe at the idea of perpetually paying tribute to their creditors and owners abroad. A country that is now aspiring to an "Ownership Society" will not find happiness in – and I’ll use hyperbole here for emphasis – a "Sharecropper’s Society." But that’s precisely where our trade policies, supported by Republicans and Democrats alike, are taking us.
Many prominent U.S. financial figures, both in and out of government, have stated that our current-account deficits cannot persist. For instance, the minutes of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee of June 29-30, 2004 say: "The staff noted that outsized external deficits could not be sustained indefinitely." But, despite the constant handwringing by luminaries, they offer no substantive suggestions to tame the burgeoning imbalance.
In the article I wrote for Fortune 16 months ago, I warned that "a gently declining dollar would not provide the answer." And so far it hasn’t. Yet policymakers continue to hope for a "soft landing," meanwhile counseling other countries to stimulate (read "inflate") their economies and Americans to save more. In my view these admonitions miss the mark: There are deep-rooted structural problems that will cause America to continue to run a huge current-account deficit unless trade policies either change materially or the dollar declines by a degree that could prove unsettling to financial markets.
Proponents of the trade status quo are fond of quoting Adam Smith: "What is prudence in the conduct of every family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage."
I agree. Note, however, that Mr. Smith’s statement refers to trade of product for product, not of wealth for product as our country is doing to the tune of $.6 trillion annually. Moreover, I am sure that he would never have suggested that "prudence" consisted of his "family" selling off part of its farm every day
20in order to finance its overconsumption. Yet that is just what the "great kingdom" called the United States is doing. If the U.S. was running a $.6 trillion current-account surplus, commentators worldwide would violently condemn our policy, viewing it as an extreme form of "mercantilism" – a long-discredited economic strategy under which countries fostered exports, discouraged imports, and piled up treasure. I would condemn such a policy as well. But, in effect if not in intent, the rest of the world is practicing mercantilism in respect to the U.S., an act made possible by our vast store of assets and our pristine credit history. Indeed, the world would never let any other country use a credit card denominated in its own currency to the insatiable extent we are employing ours. Presently, most foreign investors are sanguine: they may view us as spending junkies, but they know we are rich junkies as well. Our spendthrift behavior won’t, however, be tolerated indefinitely. And though it’s impossible to forecast just when and how the trade problem will be resolved, it’s improbable that the resolution will foster an increase in the value of our currency relative to that of our trading partners. We hope the U.S. adopts policies that will quickly and substantially reduce the current-account deficit. True, a prompt solution would likely cause Berkshire to record losses on its foreign-exchange contracts. But Berkshire’s resources remain heavily concentrated in dollar-based assets, and both a strong dollar and a low-inflation environment are very much in our interest. If you wish to keep abreast of trade and currency matters, read The Financial Times. This London-based paper has long been the leading source for daily international financial news and now has an excellent American edition. Both its reporting and commentary on trade are first-class. * * * * * * * * * * * * And, again, our usual caveat: macro-economics is a tough game in which few people, Charlie and I included, have demonstrated skill. We may well turn out to be wrong in our currency judgments. (Indeed, the fact that so many pundits now predict weakness for the dollar makes us uneasy.) If so, our mistake will be very public. The irony is that if we chose the opposite course, leaving all of Berkshire’s assets in dollars even as they declined significantly in value, no one would notice our mistake. John Maynard Keynes said in his masterful The General Theory: "Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally." (Or, to put it in less elegant terms, lemmings as a class may be derided but never does an individual lemming get criticized.) From a reputational standpoint, Charlie and I run a clear risk with our foreign-exchange commitment. But we believe in managing Berkshire as if we owned 100% of it ourselves. And, were that the case, we would not be following a dollar-only policy.
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